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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
















REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO 
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Appellant seeks no more than preservation of the 
status quo during its appeal -- maintenance of the respective 
positions of the parties that have existed throughout this 
litigation. Appellee responds with the untenable position that 
"nothing irrevocable will happen on July 1, 1990 if the 
judgment below is not stayed." Opposifion ("Opp."), at 2. On 
the contrary, if Price Waterhouse is forced to make appellee a 
partner on that date, she will have the duties, responsi-
bilities, functions and impact of a Price Waterhouse partner 
from that moment forward. Virtually every action, reaction and 
inaction by Ann Hopkins as a Price Waterhouse partner will have 
some kind of indelible impact on the firm, its partners, its 
staff, its clients and its reputation. No subsequent ruling by 
this Court will be able to erase the history of appellee's 
tenure as a Price Waterhouse p~rtner. 
There are very potent reasons, well known to the 
judges of this Court, why courts of equity have for centuries 
been loathe to create and to supervise the creation and 
continuation of personal, professional or artistic 
relationships. All those factors weigh heavily against forcing 
a partner on Price Waterhouse prior to the exhaustion of its 
appeal. 
Appellee's assertion that there are "no difficult 
legal questions" presented by this appeal borders on the 
frivolous. No federal court, ever, has ordered the creation of 
a partnership in a Title VII case. Whether Congress has 
created the potential for such a remedy is a highly debatable 
t . l/ d th t b 1 k 1 d d th t 1' t ques ion- an e cour e ow ac now e ge a was a 
difficult issue of first impression. This Court should not 
undermine its ability to resolve that question by allowing the 
trial court's order to create the relationship before the 
appeal can be considered. 
ii ~.~.Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII 
Remedies, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1980) (discussing the debate 
over whether tenure and partnership should be awarded as 
remedies); Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 87 
(1984) (discussing the potential problems of judicially imposed 
discrimination remedies like hiring and reinstatement because 
of "[t]he existence of highly personal, voluntary relationships 
within a business association"); Davila, The 
Underrepresentation of Hispanic Attorneys in Corporate Law 
Firms, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1403, 1427-28 (1987) (discussing the 
controversy surrounding judicial relief in employment 
discrimination cases involving upper level positions and 
judicial reluctance to force an undesirable relationship 
requiring close personal contact, exercise of professional 
judgment and voluntary associayion). 
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Appellee's arguments do not overcome the importance of 
preserving the status quo until this appeal can be considered 
on the merits. 
l. Probability of Success on the Merits. Appellee 
inexplicably asserts that appeal of the District Court's 
extraordinary, unprecedented and unwarranted order requiring 
appellee's admission to the Price Waterhouse partnership 
"presents no legal question that can be described as serious, 
much less difficult," and that "prior decisions" either 
"settle[] or clearly embrace[]" the issue. Opp., at 2-3. 
Appellee does not and cannot cite any authority for such 
pronouncements. Indeed, appellee principally relies upon 
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), but the 
plaintiff in Hishon did not seek admission as a partner. 
Therefore, the issue whether that remedy is statutorily or 
constitutionally authorized was not before the Court in 
Hishon. 2/ Moreover, although appellee concedes that "the 
Court's opinion in Hishon 'does not require that the 
relationship among partners be characterized as an employment 
relationship to which Title VII would apply,'" Opp., at 5 n.3 
(quoting Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added by appellee)), she does not even attempt to 
2/ .s.e.e_ 467 U.S. at 72 (plaintiff "sought ... compensatory 
damages 'in lieu of reinstatement and promotion to 
partnership.' This, of course, negates any claim for speciic 
performance of the contract alleged."); id. at 72-73 n.2; id. 
at 80 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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address or explain how a statute that does not afford judicial 
authority to regulate partner relationships can possibly be 
interpreted to permit a judicial decree compelling the creation 
and continuation of a voluntary professional association. 
Similarly, contrary to appellee's assertion, Opp., 
at 6-7, the 1987 decision of this Court in this case, see 
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 
1987), did not even remotely imply, let alone "unmistakably 
signal that this Court has no doubt" that partnership admission 
is an authorized Title VII remedy or an appropriate remedy 
under the facts of this case. Appellee's assertion in that 
regard is most misleading. The issue of partnership admission 
was not tried, briefed, or argued in the District Court in 
1985, and was not a question presented for review in this Court 
or in the Supreme Court. Thus, this Court has not had the 
opportunity to deliberate and consider the merits of the 
indisputably important question whether Title VII's equal 
employment provisions empower courts to create nonemployment 
relationships such as partnerships, and, indeed, that question 
has not been resolved by any other federal court. 
Other cases relied upon by appellee, Opp., at 5-6, are 
simply inapposite. Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153 (D.C. 1989), 
involved the reinstatement of a federal civil service employee 
to "essentially the same job" as he had previously held (id. at 
158), a remedy that falls squarely within the jurisdictional 
strictures of Title VII. Brown v. Trustees of Boston 
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University, 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 58 
U.S.L.W. 3796 (June 19, 1990), affirmed an order compelling 
promotion of an "assistant professor" to "associate professor" 
with tenure. Such an order creates no more than a long-term 
employment relationship. Moreover, "[c]ourts have quite rarely 
awarded tenure as a remedy for unlawful discrimination. " • • I Brown, 891 F.2d at 359, and have exercised great caution in 
doing so. Thus, the court in Brown emphasized that the 
plaintiff in that case had received "near unanimous endorsement 
by colleagues ... [which] suggest[s] strongly that there are 
no issues Q.f collegiality or the like which might make the 
granting of tenure inappropriate." Id. at 361 (emphasis 
added). Brown is therefore both legally and factually 
distinguishable from this case -- appellee has been found to 
have had "considerable problems dealing with staff and peers" 
at Price Waterhouse. 618 F. Supp. 1114, 1120 (D.D.C. 1985) . 
Other legal issues presented by this appeal are 
similarly difficult and unresolved. For example, the District 
Court determined that it was bound by the law of the case 
doctrine to a conclusion expressed in the previous Court of 
Appeals' decision with respect to whether appellee had been 
constructively discharged. But that remedial decision was 
bound up in a liability determination that was overturned by 
the Supreme Court and set out in an opinion by a panel of this 
Court that was vacated when this case was remanded to the 
District Court. And it was squarely and unavoidably tied to 
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the panel's erroneous reading of the District Court's factual 
findings. The District Court has now made it clear that while 
the initial decision to defer appellee's partnership candidacy 
may have been tainted with discrimination, the subsequent 
decision not to repropose her for partner, which made it 
impossible for her to become a partner and which was the basis 
of her decision to leave the firm, was the consequence of an 
unreasonable and intentional act by appellee and was not 
tainted in any way by discrimination. Under these 
circumstances, the constructive discharge holding, which is 
central to the partnership decree, is not the law of the case 
and cannot be affirmed on appeal.~/ 
2 • Irreparable Injury. Appellee's arguments on the 
irreparable injury issue are without merit. She asserts that 
Price Waterhouse "[p]artners come and go constantly without 
judicial intervention," Opp., at 2, and "this occurs without 
trauma or serious injury to the ongoing firm." Opp., at 8. 
However, partners selected in the rigorous Price Waterhouse 
~/ Appellee's conclusory statement that the District Court's 
imposition of Title VII liability under the amorphous and 
ill-defined sex stereotyping theory is "unassailable" under the 
"clearly erroneous standard" (Opp., at 5) implies that it is 
impossible to meet that standard on appeal from a district 
court's Title VII judgment. This Court, however, has not 
hesitated to overturn district court rulings, where, as here, a 
district court has seriously misinterpreted the record. 
Compare Palmer v. Baker, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1458, 
1461 (D.C. Cir. May 11, 1990) (reversing district court's 
ruling that defendant had not violated Title VII because 
"district court's conclusion . was based on a clearly 
erroneous interpretation" of th~ evidence). 
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partnership selection process (618 F. Supp. at 1111-12) are not 
fungible. The issue is whether appellant will be irreparably 
injured by the forced, and, Price Waterhouse submits, 
erroneous, admission into the partnership of a candidate whose 
own "unreasonable, intentional conduct" (Motion, App. A, at 23) 
made it impossible for her to become a partner. In the absence 
of a stay, the partners of Price Waterhouse will have lost a 
substantial measure of the power to control admission to their 
partnership, to "place a high premium on candidates' ability to 
deal with subordinates and peers on an interpersonal basis" 
(618 F. Supp. at 1116), and to "come down hard on abrasive 
conduct in men or women seeking partnership." Id. at 1120. 
Even if Price Waterhouse prevails on appeal, the loss of those 
rights "unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod 
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (the 
loss of associational freedoms "for even minimal periods of 
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury"). 
And every action by appellee as a Price Waterhouse 
partner will reflect in some measure on its partners and the 
partnership. Because an organization is large and because each 
of its partners might not know every other partner does not 
mean that it is less of a professional association with high 
standards for partnership admission and consistent principles 
for the selection of partners and relationships between 
partners, staff and clients. Any conduct by appellee towards 
subordinates or involving the work of the firm will be that of 
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a Price Waterhouse partner and will have a truly unchangeable 
and irreparable effect. 
On the other hand, appellee's claims that she will be 
irreparably injured if a stay is granted are wholly unfounded. 
She asserts that she has "lost seven irreplaceable years of 
partnership," Opp., at 9, but as the District Court's decision 
makes clear, appellee wholly "failed to make a reasonable 
effort to find" a position comparable to a Price Waterhouse 
partnership, although "there were numerous opportunities open 
to her" for comparable positions. Motion, App. A, at 26-27. 
Appellee's suggestion that she sought and obtained the "best 
possible alternative employment," Opp. at 10, is flatly 
contradicted by the District Court's holding that appellee 
failed to mitigate. Having utterly failed even to seek a 
partnership elsewhere in a comparable firm, appellee cannot now 
contend that she will be substantially or irreparably harmed if 
she remains in her "absolutely superb" (1990 Tr. at 25) 
position at the World Bank during the pendency of appeal. 
3 • Public Interest. Appellee's assertions that an 
order maintaining the status™ would be contrary to the 
"public interest" because the District Court's decision has 
been "widely reported" in the media and because a stay might 
somehow be "disturbing" (Opp., at 11) to the public are 
fanciful. As appellant explained in its Motion, at 17-18, the 
fact that important and substantial public policy questions are 
involved in this case strongly supports a stay. If the status 
t 
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.9JJ.Q is maintained while this Court considers the legal 
questions presented by this appeal, the Title VII policy of 
eradicating discrimination will not be harmed. Indeed, a 
reasoned decision by this Court can only serve to clarify the 
standards that govern employment relationships in the 
partnership setting. Appellee wants an interim partnership, 
but that relief will surely not serve the public interest if it 
is ultimately determined that she is not entitled to it. And 
it is surely not in the public interest to undermine the 
ability of a Title VII defendant to receive a full and complete 
judicial review of its legitimate, legal defenses. 
4. Automatic Stay of the Money Judgment. Appellee 
conceded in the District Court that appellant is entitled to an 
automatic stay of the back pay portion of the judgment upon the 
posting of a bond. Pl. Opp. to Mot. for Stay, at 1. Her 
attempt to escape the plain meaning of Rule 62(d) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by labeling the $371,175 back 
pay award "equitable" relief rather than "legal" damages cannot 
change the character of the back pay award, which is 
indisputably a "money judgment." See,~, Lightfoot v. 
Walker, 797 F.2d 505, 506 (7th Cir. 1986) (equitable order 
awarding attorney's fees in federal discrimination case 
constitutes money judgment and posting of bond "entitles the 
appellant to a stay of the judgment"). "Beyond question, Rule 
62(d) entitles the appellant who files a satisfactory 
supersedeas bond to a stay of [a] money judgment ll ~ matter of \ 
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right." Federal Prescription Service v. American 
Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 636 F.2d 755, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
( h . . . . 1) 4/ emp asis in or1g1na .-
CONCLUSION 
Appellee's own intentional conduct made it impossible 
for her to become a Price Waterhouse partner. When she left 
the firm she made no reasonable effort to mitigate her 
damages. She is not entitled to an interim Price Waterhouse 
partnership while important, difficult and unresolved legal 
issues are still before the courts. 




Ulric R. Sullivan 
Assistant General 
PRICE WATERHOUSE 
1251 Avenue of the 







(D.C. Bar No. 367456) 
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. 
(D.C. Bar No. 420440) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N. w. 
Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 955-8500 
~/ Rule 62(d) has been interpreted to entitle an appellant to 
a stay as a matter of right even where an equitable order does 
not include a money judgment component. £e.§. Becker v. United 
States, 451 U.S. 1306, 1309 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) 
(taxpayer appealing order compelling it to turn over materials 
in response to tax summons entitled to automatic stay upon 
posting bond). 
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